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NOTES
The New “Web-Stream” of Commerce:
Amazon and the Necessity of
Strict Products Liability for
Online Marketplaces
Technology company Amazon has actively transformed into an
e-commerce giant over the last two decades. Once a simple online bookstore,
Amazon now boasts an ever-expanding identity as global cloud computing
provider, major player in artificial intelligence, brick-and-mortar grocery store,
and producer of original video content. At its roots, the company remains
focused on e-commerce—its multibillion-dollar online marketplace hosts a
massive digital space for commerce worldwide where customers can order
“anything, with a capital A.”
Amazon derives many of its sales from third-party vendors who list
products on the company’s website, Amazon.com. In this broadening chain of
distribution for online retail, complicated tort issues arise in determining what
entity should be held responsible when defective third-party products are sold
to, and severely injure, consumers. Modern products liability law under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes strict liability on any seller of a defective
product. Amazon has sought to avoid this liability by claiming it is not the seller
but is instead a neutral platform that merely facilitates third-party sales. And
until recently, courts have agreed.
Inspired by a handful of recent cases signaling a possible shift in U.S.
products liability law, this Note proposes a statutory solution to hold online
marketplaces such as Amazon to the same strict liability standards as brickand-mortar retailers. This Note offers a statutory definition of “seller” that
would extend liability to any party responsible for placing a defective product
into the stream of commerce, providing a method of recourse for injured
consumers that is not reliant on the courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2014, Heather Oberdorf logged on to Amazon.com
to purchase a collar for her dog, Sadie. Just a month later, Oberdorf
returned home from work, attached a retractable leash to the collar,
and took Sadie for a walk. Unexpectedly, the dog lunged, causing the
D-ring on the collar to break and the leash to quickly recoil back, hitting
Oberdorf’s face and smashing her eyeglasses. The incident left Oberdorf
permanently blind in her left eye.1
After the accident, Oberdorf attempted to contact The Furry
Gang, the third-party vendor that had listed the collar for sale on
Amazon’s website, but the company had ostensibly disappeared. She
was unable to locate any contact information for The Furry Gang or find

1.

Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2019).
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the names or identities of any representatives.2 So Oberdorf filed suit
against Amazon, bringing claims for strict products liability and
negligence.3 In response, Amazon argued it could not be held
responsible for the defective product because it was not the seller; it was
the digital platform that merely hosted the transaction for the vendor.4
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania agreed and found that under Pennsylvania law, Amazon
could not be held liable for Oberdorf’s injuries.5 This decision was
consistent with similar cases in other jurisdictions holding Amazon not
liable for products liability claims because Amazon was not considered
a “seller” under state law. 6 Oberdorf appealed, however, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district
court’s dismissal.7 It marked the first time a federal court of appeals
found Amazon constituted a “seller” subject to liability under state law
for sales of defective third-party products made available through its
online marketplace.8
This accident and its ensuing litigation encapsulate the
complicated tort issues that arise with respect to products sold on giant
“e-commerce” sites like Amazon and similar online retail platforms such
as auction site eBay, web craft store Etsy, or classified advertisement
site Craigslist. Who is responsible for defective products that injure
consumers? Which entities should be deemed at fault—those that
create a product in the first place or those that distribute it on the
market? Who is best available to the consumer for recourse?
With online marketplaces increasingly replacing brick-andmortar stores in the modern economy, the purchase of consumer goods
has become at once both simpler and more complex. In just a few
2.
Complaint at ¶ 10, Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017)
(No. 4:16-CV-01127).
3.
Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 140.
4.
Id. at 143.
5.
Id. at 140.
6.
See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 429 (6th Cir. 2019); Erie Ins. Co. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir. 2019); Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 3d
766, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at *1 (D.N.J. July
24, 2018).
7.
In August 2019, the Third Circuit granted Amazon’s motion to rehear this case en banc
and vacated the panel’s opinion. In June 2020, the court determined that the liability questions
would best be answered by Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court. By September 2020, Oberdorf had
agreed to end her lawsuit against Amazon, and the parties settled—ultimately leaving open the
question of whether Amazon can face strict liability for defective third-party products sold on
its website.
8.
The court also discussed whether Oberdorf’s claims were barred by the Communications
Decency Act (“CDA”) regarding Amazon’s role in the publication of third-party content. Analysis
of the CDA’s protections are beyond the scope of this Note.
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keystrokes, consumers can access thousands of products in a wide
variety of categories on a single website and complete a transaction in
a matter of seconds. And yet, the relationship between buyer and seller
has been transformed and expanded to include a long list of entities
outside the traditional supply chain. A manufacturer may construct the
item but may pass it on to be sold by another entity; a vendor might list
its product online and advertise it to the consumer; online marketplaces
like Amazon may store the product in their warehouses, take payment
from the purchaser, process the sale, package the item, and ultimately
ship it to a customer’s home.
In cases of defective products sold by third-party vendors on
Amazon’s website, courts have generally refused to extend tort liability
to Amazon.9 Recent cases such as Oberdorf, however, signal a shift in
the U.S. products liability regime,10 one that returns to the theory of
“absolute” strict products liability as it was first articulated by
California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor’s concurrence in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.11 These cases support the expansion of
liability for internet marketplaces, appropriately targeting these
players as the entities most available to injured consumers, best able to
incentivize a safer market, and in the best position to distribute the
costs of compensation for potential liability.
This Note proposes a statutory solution advocating for the
application of truly strict products liability against online marketplaces
such as Amazon. It presents statutory language and a formal definition
of “seller” that would extend liability to any party that is responsible for
placing a defective product into the stream of commerce, without any
requirement of privity or showing of negligence. Part I offers a broad
overview of the development of products liability law in the United
States, as well as background information on Amazon’s operations as
an online marketplace and its relationship with third-party vendors.
Part II examines recent approaches to Amazon’s liability under existing
state products liability regimes. It also considers current arguments for
and against insulating Amazon from liability for injuries resulting from
defective products sold to consumers. Part III advocates returning to a
truly strict theory of products liability, based on the model of strict
liability provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the policy
rationales originally espoused by Justice Traynor in Escola.12
9.
See Fox, 930 F.3d at 429; Erie, 925 F.3d at 143; Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 782; Eberhart,
325 F. Supp. 3d at 401; Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *1.
10. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 136; see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F.
Supp. 3d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2019).
11. 150 P.2d 436, 461 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 462–64.
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Ultimately, this Note recommends statutory language for states to
adopt that would subject online marketplaces like Amazon to strict
liability for defective third-party products that they enter into the “webstream” of commerce.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Development of Products Liability Law
Products liability refers to the field of law involving the liability
of those who supply products to purchasers and users when losses and
injuries result from defects in such products.13 Dangerous or defective
product conditions can result in different kinds of physical or intangible
losses, affecting different groups of purchasers, users, or nonparties
who suffer those losses.14 To redress these losses, a variety of theories
of recovery are available to claimants, typically based in contract or tort,
with liability established on the basis of negligence or strict liability.15
1. Privity of Contract
Originally, common law recovery in a negligence action for
injuries caused by defective products depended on the existence of
privity of contract between the injured consumer and the manufacturer
or seller.16 This English common law principle originated with the
nineteenth-century case Winterbottom v. Wright, which established the
general rule that any seller of goods would not be liable for damages
caused by their defective products to anyone except the immediate

13. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 96, at 677 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Prosser and Keeton, in their classic hornbook on tort law, categorized their theories of
recovery and types of losses as follows: (1) two types of product conditions that can result in loss
to purchasers or third persons (dangerous or inferior); (2) at least five kinds of resulting losses
(personal injury, harm to tangible things, harm to the product by the original purchaser, harm to
products constructed or repaired with a target seller’s component part, and economic loss); and (3)
three groups of those who suffer such losses (purchasers, users who are not purchasers, and
nonusers). Id. at 677–79. Together, these categories make available four possible theories of
recovery: strict liability in contract for breach of warranty; negligence liability in contract for
breach of warranty; negligence liability in tort; and strict liability in tort. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (cautioning against the
risk of an “infinity of actions” if the plaintiff could sue where there is no privity of contract):
[E]very passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the
upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of
such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
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buyer.17 U.S. courts adopted this principle, which reflected a reluctance
to place strict liability burdens on manufacturers in order to drive
nineteenth-century
economic
growth.18
Courts
restricted
manufacturers’ duty of care to only those consumers actually in privity
and confined that privity to the consumers that manufacturers dealt
with directly.19 This liability approach was based on the rationale that
“industry could not grow and prosper if it had to pay for any and all
injuries its defective products caused.”20
But in the early 1900s, products liability law evolved as a result
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.21 There, the New York Court of
Appeals abolished the privity rule for negligence cases. 22 The majority
permitted the plaintiff’s negligence claim to proceed against automobile
manufacturer Buick after the plaintiff’s car collapsed as a result of
defective wheels and he was thrown from the car and injured.23 The
plaintiff was not in privity with the manufacturer, having instead
purchased the car from a retailer, but the court concluded that Buick
still owed a duty of care to the consumer and was still liable for
negligence to parties beyond the immediate purchaser of its products.24
The MacPherson court reasoned that if a manufacturer put forth a
product that might reasonably be expected to cause harm when
defective, the manufacturer would be “under a duty to make it
carefully”—essentially leaving a showing of negligence as the plaintiff’s
only burden.25 The resulting products liability rule held sellers liable
for negligence in the manufacture or sale of any product that could
reasonably be expected to be capable of inflicting substantial harm if
defective in any way.26

17. Id. at 404–05.
18. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 682.
19. Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363, 363 (1965).
20. Id. at 363–64 (“[Courts] feared a plaintiff-population explosion, and could not envisage
how a manufacturer could be expected to exercise reasonable care toward just anybody he could
foresee might suffer injury from his defective product.”).
21. 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
22. Id. at 389–90.
23. Id. at 384–85.
24. Id. at 392–93 (“There is nothing anomalous in a rule which imposes upon A, who has
contracted with B, a duty to C and D and others according as he knows or does not know that the
subject-matter of the contract is intended for their use.”); see also id. at 397 (Bartlett, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting the rejection of the general rule that “[the] furnisher of an article is not liable
to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the construction,
manufacture, or sale of such article”).
25. Id. at 389–90 (majority opinion) (“If [the manufacturer] is negligent, where danger is to
be foreseen, a liability will follow.”).
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 683.
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2. Absolute Liability in Food Products and Beyond
With the liability of sellers and manufacturers now established
on the basis of negligence, courts in the decades following MacPherson
attempted to impose further responsibility—to hold parties liable even
where they might have exercised all reasonable care and even without
privity of contract between the victim buyer and defendant seller.27 This
absolute liability imposed on manufacturers and other sellers for
physical harm to persons and things “went far beyond concepts about
promissory or contractual obligations.”28
A trio of cases in California introduced this theory of absolute
liability for defective products, beginning with the California Supreme
Court case Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.29 There, the majority
applied the negligence theory of res ipsa loquitor, 30 holding the
defendant bottling company liable for injuries suffered by a restaurant
waitress when a glass bottle of Coca-Cola exploded in her hand.31
Though agreeing with the result, Justice Traynor in his concurrence
separately sought to apply a theory of absolute liability. This
concurrence made Escola especially influential to the development of
strict products liability.32
Recognizing the trend in food product cases, where
manufacturers of defective food products could be held to an implied
warranty of quality that ran to remote consumers (not just to immediate
purchasers), Justice Traynor asserted that parallel protections should
be extended for consumers of all types of defective products: “Dangers
to life and health inhere in other consumers’ goods that are defective
and there is no reason to differentiate them from the dangers of
defective food products.”33 He advocated for manufacturers incurring
“absolute liability when an article that [they have] placed on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have
27. Id. § 97 at 690.
28. Id. § 98 at 692.
29. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
30. Res ipsa loquitur (Latin for “the thing speaks for itself”) is a tort law doctrine where the
court infers negligence from the very nature of the accident itself; the rule allows a plaintiff to
create a rebuttable presumption of negligence by offering circumstantial evidence, without having
to prove specific negligent conduct by the defendant. Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep.
299, 300.
31. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (holding “all the requirements necessary to entitle plaintiff to
rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference of negligence are present”). The
court explained that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor does not apply unless (1) the defendant had
exclusive control of the thing causing injury, and (2) the accident was of such a nature that it
ordinarily would not occur in the absence of some negligence by the defendant. Id. at 438.
32. Id. at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 442.
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a defect that causes injury to human beings.” 34 This strict liability of
manufacturers to all consumers injured by defective products would
follow “without proof of negligence.”35 Justice Traynor explained that
compelling policy reasons existed in support of imposing such strict
liability: he emphasized the need to compensate innocent customers,
the ability of manufacturers to insure against the risk of injury and
distribute the costs of compensating victims, and the possibility of
incentivizing the creation of safer products.36 Additionally, Justice
Traynor reasoned that such an adjustment in products liability law was
a necessary response to the changes in how products were being
manufactured, advertised, and sold in the modern world.37
Over the next twenty years, a number of courts and scholars
increasingly argued for strict manufacturer liability for defective
products generally.38 In 1960, Dean William Prosser published his
groundbreaking article Assault upon the Citadel, which predicted and
argued for a generalized doctrine of strict liability for the sale of any
category of defective products, a doctrine that lay explicitly in tort.39
This rule would avoid the previous obstacles to recovery found in
contract law, such as requiring privity, title to the good, disclaimers,
or notice.40

34. Id. at 440.
35. Id. at 442.
36. Id. at 440–41 (“Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market.”).
37. Id. at 443:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and
transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of
a product has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are
ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer
no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of
a product . . . ;
see also Traynor, supra note 19, at 363 (“The great expansion of a manufacturer’s liability for
negligence since [MacPherson] marks the transition from industrial revolution to a settled
industrial society.”).
38. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 83 (N.J. 1960) (explaining
why the demise of the privity defense in personal injury cases involving foodstuffs compelled the
same application for cases involving other defective products, such as automobiles):
We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly in a bottle of
beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome beverage may bring illness to
one person, the defective car, with its great potentiality for harm to the driver,
occupants, and others, demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity.
39. William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1140 (1960).
40. Id. at 1127–34 (“If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability in tort,
declared outright, without an illusory contract mask.”).
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Just three years later, Justice Traynor wrote the majority
opinion for Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. Relying on his
previous Escola concurrence, Justice Traynor embraced truly “strict”
products liability to hold a manufacturer liable for severe injuries
inflicted by a defective power tool attachment.41 The majority adopted
the clear rule that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being.”42 As predicted by Prosser, this liability would be imposed
as a matter of tort law, not by any implied warranty under contract
law.43 Strict liability in tort also meant that a “plaintiff’s claim would
not be barred by the defendant’s contractual disclaimers or limits
on liability.”44
The next year, Justice Traynor also wrote the majority opinion
in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., which further broadened the theory
of strict products liability to apply even to nonmanufacturing
retailers.45 The court held an authorized dealer strictly liable for
injuries resulting from an assembly defect that caused an automobile
accident.46 The court emphasized that because retailers, like
manufacturers, are involved in the business of distributing goods to the
public, they should be considered an “integral part of the overall
producing and marketing enterprise” and therefore “should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products.”47 Again, the policy
justifications set forth in Justice Traynor’s original Escola concurrence
supported the imposition of strict liability for manufacturers and
retailers alike.48

41. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900–01 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
42. Id. at 900.
43. Id. at 901.
44. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 450 (2d
ed. 2020).
45. 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 171.
48. See id. at 171–72:
In some cases the retailer may be the only member of that enterprise reasonably
available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a
substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert
pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as
an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike
affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the
defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course
of their continuing business relationship.
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3. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, promulgated the year
following Vandermark, incorporated these developing theories of strict
products liability into a new section, 402A.49 Crafted by Dean Prosser,
section 402A provided that liability would be imposed on “one who sells”
any defective products that cause physical harm to the consumer or
ultimate user, “whether or not they were at fault and whether or not
they were in privity with the plaintiff.”50 The only requirements for such
liability were that the seller be “engaged in the business of selling” such
products and that the defective products “reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which [they were] sold.”51
Comment c to section 402 further articulated the justifications Justice
Traynor provided in Escola: “[P]ublic policy demands that the burden
of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be
placed upon those who market them” and “the proper persons to afford
[the cost of such liability] are those who market the products.”52 The
commenters explained that such a seller “has undertaken and assumed
a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured” by a product.53 The Restatement clarified that this
rule would apply liability to any person engaged in the business of
selling products—including, but not limited to, any “manufacturer,”
“any wholesale or retail dealer,” or any “distributor.”54 With these
developments, section 402A precipitated a major expansion of the
imposition of strict liability on sellers and protections for consumers55

49. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 44, § 450. See generally DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW § 5.3 (2005) (discussing the drafting process of section 402A, which originally
addressed strict liability for the sale of “food for human consumption,” but was ultimately
expanded to apply to all products).
50. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 44, § 450; see OWEN, supra note 49, § 5.3, at 260 (“[T]he liability
principle of § 402A is short and simple: manufacturers and other suppliers are subject to strict
liability in tort for injuries caused by defects in the products that they sell.” (emphasis added)).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
52. Id. § 402A cmt. c; see Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1965).
54. Id. § 402A cmt. f.
55. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1992) (indicating that
section 402A has been cited by “thousands upon thousands of product liability decisions”); William
L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793–
94 (1966) (characterizing the adoption of strict products liability following the promulgation of
section 402A as “the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule in the
entire history of the law of torts” (footnote omitted)).
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and would serve as a foundation for the development of a number of
states’ products liability law regimes in the years following.56
B. Amazon’s Online Marketplace
Retail giant Amazon has played a substantial role in the rise of
e-commerce through the operation of its website Amazon.com. A pioneer
in online shopping, Amazon evolved from originally selling only books57
to selling “anything, with a capital A.”58 By 2019, its share of the U.S.
e-commerce market was more than double the market share of its next
nine competitors combined.59 As a giant online marketplace, Amazon
has fulfilled its goal of transforming into the paradigmatic internet
shopping bazaar, providing a megaplatform that facilitates
transactions by creating a “digital space for commerce.”60
Originally, Amazon operated as a simple online retailer, one that
procured goods at wholesale prices from suppliers and sold them at
retail prices to consumers.61 In 1999, Amazon introduced Auctions, its
online auction service, and zShops, a service through which businesses
could set up independent online storefronts.62 These soon evolved into
the Amazon Marketplace, launched in 2000, which allowed third-party
merchants to market and sell their products directly to Amazon
customers.63 Of the millions of products now offered for sale on its
website, some are still offered for sale directly by Amazon itself, but a
“significant portion”64 is sold by third-party vendors who take
advantage of the Amazon Marketplace service to access a wider

56. Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 714 (1970) (noting that “state courts in at least 15
jurisdictions” had adopted section 402A just five years after its promulgation).
57. Makeda Easter & Paresh Dave, Remember When Amazon Only Sold Books?, L.A. TIMES
(June 18, 2017, 12:40 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-amazon-history-20170618htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/GF6Y-NQYX] (detailing Amazon’s history and origins as an
online bookselling site).
58. Leslie Kaufman, Amazon.com Plans a Transformation to Internet Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/30/business/amazoncom-plans-a-transform
ation-to-internet-bazaar.html [https://perma.cc/95ZA-5ZKU] (quoting Jeff Bezos, Amazon founder
and CEO).
59. Lina M. Kahn, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973,
986 (2019).
60. Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler, From the Digital to the Physical: Federal
Limitations on Regulating Online Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 144 (2019).
61. Kahn, supra note 59, at 985.
62. Feng Zhu & Qihong Liu, Competing with Complementors: An Empirical Look at
Amazon.com, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2618, 2623–24 (2018).
63. Id.
64. Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
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consumer market.65 In 2017, for example, more than fifty percent of all
units sold on Amazon came from third-party sellers.66
1. Amazon’s Distribution Methods
For these third-party vendors, Amazon offers two methods to
fulfill orders for products available on its website: “Fulfilled by Amazon”
(“FBA”) or “Fulfilled by Merchant” (“FBM”).67 If a third-party vendor
elects to use the FBA service, then Amazon inventories, stores,
packages, ships, and handles customer service and returns for the
vendor’s products.68 This service allows vendors to manage their
inventory and market their products to a wider reach of customers. As
a result, Amazon charges vendors certain fulfillment and storage fees
while handling all payment processing from customers.69 Throughout
the FBA process, vendors retain title to their products, even though
Amazon stores, ships, and delivers the products to buyers.70
If a third-party vendor does not elect to use FBA and, instead,
opts for FBM, the vendor remains personally responsible for all
packaging, shipping, and customer service responsibilities, though
Amazon continues to handle all payment processing.71 If a third-party
vendor provides a product using the FBM service, Amazon has no
physical interaction with that product “at any time throughout the
course of the transaction.”72
2. Amazon’s Guarantees
Regardless of the method by which orders are fulfilled, Amazon
requires all third-party vendors to agree to the Amazon Services
Business Solutions Agreement (“BSA”), which provides the terms of
65. Ryan Bullard, Note, Out-Teching Products Liability: Reviving Strict Products Liability in
an Age of Amazon, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 181, 193 (2019). See generally Oberdorf v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 140–42 (3d Cir. 2019) (providing a detailed description of the “anatomy of a
sale” by third-party vendors on Amazon’s online marketplace).
66. Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 18, 2018).
67. John E. Lincoln, Fulfillment by Amazon vs. Fulfillment by Merchant vs. Seller-Fulfilled
Prime (The Ultimate Guide), IGNITE VISIBILITY (July 25, 2017), https://ignitevisibility.com/
fulfillment-amazon-vs-fulfillment-merchant-vs-seller-fulfilled-prime-ultimate-guide/
[https://perma.cc/Y73E-9P7N].
68. Fulfillment by Amazon: How It Works, AMAZON SERVS., https://sell.amazon.com/
fulfillment-by-amazon.html?ref_=asus_soa_rd& (last visited Jan. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8D
GU-BECT]; Lincoln, supra note 67.
69. Lincoln, supra note 67.
70. Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
71. Lincoln, supra note 67.
72. Amy Elizabeth Shehan, Note, Amazon’s Invincibility: The Effect of Defective Third-Party
Vendors’ Products on Amazon, 53 GA. L. REV. 1215, 1220 (2019).
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service for third-party vendors worldwide and offers a variety of
optional services for sellers.73 Under the terms of the BSA, third-party
vendors remain responsible for “deciding what to sell, sourcing their
products, providing product descriptions, setting the prices for their
products, and packaging their products (or ensuring their products are
properly packaged).”74 Notably, section 6 of the BSA requires thirdparty vendors to indemnify Amazon from any claims, losses, damages,
or costs arising from the sale of products, and section 9 requires vendors
to maintain liability insurance in conjunction with the operation of any
product sales.75 Under the BSA, third-party vendors must also provide
Amazon with a set of necessary product information, including price,
brand, model, dimensions, weight, a product description, digital images
of the product, and shipping and handling options, which Amazon uses
to build the product’s listing on its website. 76
Importantly, under the BSA, Amazon retains the right at any
point during the sales process to “cease providing any or all of the
Services at its sole discretion and without notice, including suspending,
prohibiting, or removing any listing.”77 This means that Amazon also
retains the right to require any third-party vendor to stop or cancel
orders of any product or to withhold payments to a vendor if Amazon
determines that a vendor’s actions may result in unjustifiable risks to
Amazon or another third party.78
Finally, Amazon provides a guarantee to all customers for all
products purchased from third-party vendors on its online marketplace
under its “A-to-z Guarantee.”79 Specifically, the Guarantee applies to
“the timely delivery and the condition of [the purchased items],” such
that customers may be eligible to request a refund if certain conditions
are (or are not) met.80 The Guarantee does not function as a strict

73. Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 396; see Amazon Services Business Solutions Agreement,
AMAZON: SELLER CENT., https://sellercentral.amazon.com/gp/help/1791 (last visited Jan. 1, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/EEU6-7BRX] [hereinafter Business Solutions Agreement] (containing terms and
conditions on enrollment, payments, termination, license, representations, indemnification,
disclaimer and general release, limitation of liability, insurance, tax matters, confidentiality, force
majeure, relationship of the parties, suggestions, modification, password security, export, and
other miscellaneous topics).
74. Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 396.
75. Business Solutions Agreement, supra note 73.
76. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2019).
77. Id. at 142.
78. Id.
79. See About A-Z Guarantee, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html?nodeId=201889410 (last visited Jan. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R9ZJ-2B8X] (“The Amazon Ato-z Guarantee protects you when you purchase items sold and fulfilled by a third-party seller.”).
80. Id.:
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warranty, however, and there are several restrictions limiting this
guarantee’s scope.81
*

*

*

The BSA and a vendor’s chosen distribution method define
almost every aspect of the relationship between Amazon and thirdparty vendors. On their own, however, these elements do not fully
illustrate Amazon’s essential role in the placement of defective products
into the hands of consumers. The rest of this Note will provide further
analysis of Amazon’s intimate involvement in the buyer experience,
retail transaction, and e-commerce distribution chain, as well as an
examination of existing case law, to demonstrate the necessity of strict
products liability for online marketplaces such as Amazon.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AS APPLIED TO THIRD-PARTY VENDORS’
PRODUCTS ON AMAZON’S MARKETPLACE
The sheer volume of third-party sales through Amazon has
naturally raised the issue of whether, and when, Amazon should be
liable for harm caused by defective products under traditional theories
of strict products liability. In the case of defective products sold by thirdparty vendors on Amazon’s Marketplace, courts have generally declined
to extend strict liability to Amazon. A string of recent cases has
reinforced Amazon’s position that it merely provides an online platform
for the sale of products, each finding that Amazon does not exercise
sufficient control over third-party vendors’ products to qualify as a
“seller” in order to subject it to products liability claims.82 Two recent
cases, however, have demonstrated a possible—and this Note would
posit necessary—shift in the U.S. products liability regime.83 This
You may . . . request a refund . . . when the following applies: 1. You have not received
your package and three days have passed since the maximum estimated delivery date
or the tracking shows a delivery confirmation, whichever is sooner[;] 2. You received an
order that is different than expected and have requested a return with the seller[;] 3.
You returned your item with a trackable shipping method and the seller has not issued
you a refund.
81. See id. (noting that the guarantee does not cover, for example, digital items or payments
for services).
82. See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 429 (6th Cir. 2019); Erie Ins. Co. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir. 2019); Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 3d
766, 782 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at *1 (D.N.J. July
24, 2018).
83. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d 136; State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp.
3d 964 (W.D. Wis. 2019).

2021]

THE NEW “WEB-STREAM” OF COMMERCE

201

signaled change recognizes Amazon’s role as more than just a neutral
website or platform merely facilitating a transaction but rather as the
entity most responsible for placing defective products into the stream of
commerce. In holding Amazon liable for defective third-party products
purchased through its online marketplace, these cases support a return
to the truly “strict” liability advocated by Justice Traynor and embodied
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.84
A. Arguments for Insulating Amazon from Liability
Amazon asserts that it is not sufficiently responsible for placing
defective products into the hands of consumers to be subjected to tort
liability. The retail giant relies on its lack of oversight for, and distance
from, third-party vendors as justification for disclaiming its own
liability for injuries resulting from these products. Amazon has noted
that it does not set the price of third-party vendors’ products,85 create
the content of the product listings on its website, or possess title over
the products, even when it packages and ships products under the FBA
service.86 As a result, Amazon argues that merely providing a website
for use by other, independent sellers does not transform Amazon into a
seller itself; rather, it merely acts as a facilitator of sales by third-party
vendors under its fulfillment programs.87
1. Nonassumption of Title, Lack of Control
Amazon asserts as a threshold matter that it cannot constitute
a “seller” within that term’s ordinary meaning and thus cannot be
subject to liability under state products liability laws that impose
liability specifically on sellers of defective products. Under Amazon’s
reasoning, a “sale” requires the “transfer of ownership of and the title
to property from one person to another for a price.”88 So where it does

84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
85. See Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *8 (noting that the BSA mandates that “sellers set
their own prices, constrained only by the prices they set in other channels”).
86. See, e.g., Erie, 925 F.3d at 142:
Indeed, even as Amazon possessed the headlamp in its warehouse, Dream Light set the
price for the sale of the product to purchasers, designed the product description for the
website, paid Amazon for its fulfillment services, and ultimately received the purchase
price paid by the purchaser. . . . Moreover, the agreement . . . contemplates that Dream
Light, not Amazon, retained title to the goods . . . .
87. Id. at 144.
88. Id. at 141 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1097 (11th ed. 2007)).

202

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1:187

not take title to third-party products offered through its website,
Amazon cannot be transformed into the seller of the product.89
Recent case law supporting this position has similarly focused
on the nonassumption of title and resulting lack of control that Amazon
exercises over third-party products listed on its website. For example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held
in Erie Insurance Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc. that Amazon could not be
considered the seller of a defective headlamp under Maryland law,
which defined “sale” as “the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price.”90 A customer had purchased the headlamp on Amazon’s
website, where it was listed as sold by third-party vendor Dream Light
and fulfilled by Amazon.91 According to transaction agreements such as
the BSA, Amazon possessed the product in its warehouse, packaged the
item, and ultimately shipped it to the purchaser.92 Sometime later, the
headlamp malfunctioned and set fire to the owner’s home. 93 The court
held that Amazon could not be liable for the product’s defective
condition because Maryland law imposes liability only on sellers who
actually transfer ownership and title to purchasers of that property for
a price.94 Amazon successfully argued that since it never obtained title
to the headlamp, it could not incur the liability attributable to sellers of
defective goods under Maryland law.95
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held in Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc. that Amazon did not constitute
a seller of a defective hoverboard under Tennessee law, even though the
statute loosely defined a “seller” as “any individual or entity engaged in
the business of selling a product.”96 The hoverboard had been purchased
on Amazon’s website, sold by a third-party vendor, and shipped from
China, though the parties disputed whether the product had been part
of the FBA service.97 A few months later, customer complaints and
investigations revealed a risk of fires or explosions involving similar
hoverboards purchased on Amazon’s website. Unfortunately for
89. See id. at 142 (reasoning that because under the BSA, if a vendor requested Amazon to
dispose of certain products stored in Amazon’s warehouse, “title to each disposed unit [would]
transfer to [Amazon],” it indicated that title otherwise remained with the third-party vendor
(alterations in original)).
90. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-106(1) (West 2020); Erie, 925 F.3d at 141.
91. For a discussion of Amazon’s distribution methods, see supra Section I.B.1.
92. Erie, 925 F.3d at 138.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 141.
95. Id. at 142, 144.
96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (2012); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 422 (6th
Cir. 2019).
97. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May
30, 2018).

2021]

THE NEW “WEB-STREAM” OF COMMERCE

203

members of the Fox family, whose home burned down when the
hoverboard’s battery caught fire, the Sixth Circuit held that Amazon
had not exercised sufficient control over the sale of the hoverboard to be
held liable for the damage caused by the defective product. 98 Notably,
however, the court rejected a narrow construction of the term “seller”
that would limit the definition to entities engaged in the transfer of title
to a product.99 Still, the court emphasized the importance of control
under Tennessee products liability law, concluding that liability is
contingent upon the targeted entity exercising “a significant degree of
control” over the product in the transaction.100 Simply handling
payment and communicating with customers was not a sufficient
exercise of control for Amazon to be deemed a seller under
Tennessee law.101
Reliance on a title requirement, however, is misplaced. Any
requirement for a manufacturer, retailer, or distributor to hold title to
a defective product in order to be subject to strict liability is absent from
the Restatement and applicable case law.102 Even where Amazon does
not take title to products—as perhaps in the case of vendors who use
the FBM service—Amazon still controls access to its website and the
ability to list products online, bears the risk of loss when a product is in
its inventory, regulates all buyer communications with vendors, and
handles returns and customer service requests. For those vendors who
take advantage of the FBA service, Amazon goes even further and
ultimately stores, ships, and delivers the products to a buyer. In either
case, aside from the formal transfer of title, Amazon holds the entire
“bundle of sticks”—which is to say, all the apparent attributes of
ownership.103 Amazon has upended the traditional supply chain in the
modern economy but has artificially insulated itself from the process by
purposefully rejecting any assumption of title in order to avoid
responsibility when something goes wrong—forcing consumers to bear
the cost of injuries caused by defective products.104

98. Fox, 930 F.3d at 425.
99. See id. at 422–23 (“the [Tennessee Products Liability Act’s] definition of ‘seller’ is not
limited to any individual or entity regularly engaged in transferring title to a product for an agreed
upon price, for livelihood or gain.”).
100. Id. at 424.
101. Id. at 425.
102. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
103. See Edward J. Janger & Aaron D. Twerski, The Heavy Hand of Amazon: A Seller Not A
Neutral Platform, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 259, 266–67 (2020) (explaining how once a
product is sent to an Amazon fulfillment center by a third-party vendor, “Amazon handles every
other part of the transaction with the consumer”).
104. Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 144 (4th Cir. 2019) (Motz, J., concurring).
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Further, Amazon’s narrow focus on title and degree of control
over products in the chain of distribution pointedly ignores the original
goals of the strict products liability regime as adopted in the twentieth
century and embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.105 By
claiming a position outside the distribution chain, Amazon attempts to
shirk the duty placed on manufacturers and retailers to guard against
unreasonable risks of physical harm to its customers caused by
products sold on its site. Amazon’s arguments ignore the substantive
policy justifications that originally supported the modern strict
products liability regime and are not in line with the overarching,
acknowledged policy goals of tort law, such as “deterrence, loss
distribution, corrective justice, and social responsibility.”106
2. Role as Facilitator
Amazon additionally asserts that entities that do not take title
to products as part of the chain of distribution—but rather only “render
services to facilitate that distribution or sale”—cannot be considered
sellers under state products liability laws.107 Amazon argues it should
be characterized as merely a “facilitator” of the sale of products listed
on its online marketplace.108 Recent district court decisions have also
rejected the application of strict liability to Amazon by focusing on its
removed position in the chain of distribution stretching from
manufacturer to buyer.109 Such cases have similarly characterized
Amazon as a “facilitator” or “provider of services”—services that include
maintaining an online website, warehousing and shipping goods, and
processing payments to vendors—and as an entity that stands outside
the distribution chain, not subject to liability.110
Amazon claims that transferring possession of a product (for
storage in Amazon’s warehouse or shipment in Amazon-labeled boxes
as part of its fulfillment program) merely facilitates the commercial
105. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) (“[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.”).
106. Bullard, supra note 65, at 232.
107. Erie, 925 F.3d at 141 (majority opinion).
108. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at *7 (D.N.J.
July 24, 2018).
109. See Garber v. Amazon.com, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 3d 766, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Eberhart v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
110. Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 397, 399 (emphasizing that strict liability applies only to
those entities that are “within the distribution chain”); see Garber, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 780
(characterizing Amazon as a “marketplace provider outside the distributive chain”); Allstate, 2018
WL 3546197, at *7 (describing Amazon as a facilitator, rather than an active participant, in the
sale of the defective product).
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distribution of its products and does not give Amazon the requisite level
of control over a product to transform it into a seller.111 In labeling itself
a “facilitator,”112 however, Amazon downplays the integral role it plays
in placing products into the stream of commerce.113 Put simply,
consumers would never obtain the defective products at issue without
Amazon listing the product, putting consumers in contact with thirdparty vendors, completing the sale, and enabling the supply of the
physical item to the consumer’s doorstep.
Additionally, Amazon actively manages the sale of all products
on its website, carefully curating which products are listed on the site
or even directly suggested to consumers.114 Sellers that wish to list
products on Amazon must meet certain criteria and must adhere to the
terms of service set out in the BSA.115 As part of the BSA, Amazon
controls the sale of products on its site because it retains the sole right
to add or remove listings, process or withhold payments to vendors, and
terminate its relationship with a vendor for any reason.116
3. Amazon as Neutral Platform
In support of its characterization as facilitator, Amazon
analogizes its role to that of auctioneer, one who assists in the sale and
“merely provide[s] a market as the agent of the seller.” 117 Amazon
asserts that “product distribution facilitators” are distinct from true
sellers or distributors and that Amazon is more comparable to other
web-based advertisers, sales personnel, or auctioneers under the former
category.118 There are important distinctions, however, between
Amazon and other online “auctioneers” or platforms that similarly

111. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2019); Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197,
at *8.
112. Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *7.
113. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964) (en banc)
(characterizing retailers as “an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise”).
114. Janger & Twerski, supra note 103, at 264–66 (discussing the array of strategies Amazon
employs to signal certain products to buyers, such as sponsored products, “Amazon’s Choice” and
“Best Seller” designations, and the Amazon Prime mechanism).
115. See supra Section I.B.2.
116. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2019).
117. Id. at 144 (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1989)).
118. See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (noting that
comment g to section 20 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts excludes such “facilitators” from the
class of distributors subject to strict liability); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 20
cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1998); see also Musser, 562 A.2d at 283 (holding that auctioneers are
not “sellers”).
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disrupt the traditional distribution chain, such as eBay, Craigslist, or
Etsy, which can more accurately be characterized as neutral.119
For example, online auction site eBay is clearly akin to an
auctioneer, as it requires the activity of buyers to place bids on items
for sale.120 Amazon does not require buyers to place bids on its online
products, and its careful control over product listings indicates it does
more than “merely provide a market” for third-party vendors.121 Or
compare classified advertisement website Craigslist, where sellers
must actively maintain their postings and personally provide the
content, language, and photos for the products or services they post for
sale. These sellers complete the transaction without any assistance
from the platform itself—Craigslist, as a neutral entity, merely hosts
the website, much like an online bulletin board or newspaper that
publishes classified listings. Amazon, in contrast, closely controls and
monitors the information presented for its online products listings.122
Although third-party vendors provide the content, Amazon possesses
significant editorial and publishing functions, “retain[ing] the right to
edit the content and determine the appearance of product listings.”123
Additionally, on neutral platforms such as eBay or Etsy, a
seller’s identity is more independently and distinctly presented, and the
seller information is prominently located next to the products listed.
Amazon, by comparison, only displays the designations “Sold by Seller”
and “Fulfilled by Amazon” in small type under the so-called “buy-box,”
an information-dense area of the product page where users click to add
a product to their shopping cart for purchase.124 Through manipulation
of this “buy-box,” Amazon decides which vendor will appear, chooses
whose inventory will be sold, and maximizes confusion for consumers

119. Bullard, supra note 65, at 208.
120. See Adam Cohen, ‘The Perfect Store’, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2002), https://www.
nytimes.com/2002/06/16/books/chapters/the-perfect-store.html
[https://perma.cc/F7SD-QFLW]
(noting that eBay was originally created as AuctionWeb, advertised as a “free web auction”).
121. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 144 (citing Musser, 562 A.2d at 282); see supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
122. Janger & Twerski, supra note 103, at 263.
123. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa. 2017); see also Oberdorf,
930 F.3d at 141:
Amazon formats the product’s listing on its website. This function, too, is provided for
in the [BSA], by which Amazon retains the right in its sole discretion to determine the
content, appearance, design, functionality, and all other aspects of the Services,
including by redesigning, modifying, removing, or restricting access to any of them. In
fact, the [BSA] grants Amazon a royalty-free, nonexclusive, worldwide, perpetual,
irrevocable right and license to commercially or noncommercially exploit in any
manner, the information provided by third-party vendors.
124. Bullard, supra note 65, at 208.
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as to the actual identity of the vendor.125 Compare this to a site like
Etsy, an online community for artists and crafters, where the identity
of the seller is clearly and purposefully distinguishable, and sellers are
encouraged to personalize their “virtual storefront” to attract potential
customers.126 On Etsy’s platform, sellers are prominently presented as
“small business owners”—each with their own unique personality,
customized storefront appearance, and “branded design palette.” 127 In
contrast, Amazon’s own branding is abundant throughout its site, with
its own logo on product pages and shipping materials, and it maintains
separate handling of the financial transaction, a distinct customer
support messaging system, and, now, even its own brick-andmortar storefronts.128
Finally, for truly neutral online platforms, the ability to
communicate directly with sellers is easily available to buyers, unlike
on Amazon where customer service requests and other inquiries for the
vendor must proceed exclusively through Amazon customer support.129
While Amazon contends it is a neutral platform that merely facilitates
transactions between sellers and buyers, as is the case for other online
retailers, it is clearly more than just a facilitator that provides a “means
of marketing” for a seller.130
B. Arguments for Subjecting Amazon to Liability
More recent cases provide compelling arguments in favor of
holding Amazon liable as a seller of defective products purchased
through its online marketplace.131 These arguments recognize
125. Janger & Twerski, supra note 103, at 267–70.
126. See Etsy Staff, Customizing the Look of Your Shop Home, ETSY (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.etsy.com/seller-handbook/article/customizing-the-look-of-your-shophome/358680450619 [https://perma.cc/JV58-GD63] (providing advice to sellers on how to build a
strong “visual brand”).
127. Etsy Staff, The Ultimate Guide to Branding, ETSY (July 10, 2018), https://www.etsy.com/
seller-handbook/article/the-ultimate-guide-to-branding/350364246510
[https://perma.cc/9SJBCJMS].
128. Anna Schaverien, Five Reasons Why Amazon Is Moving into Bricks-And-Mortar Retail,
FORBES (Dec. 29, 2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/annaschaverien/2018/12/29/
amazon-online-offline-store-retail/ [https://perma.cc/J3D2-DA8H] (discussing Amazon’s entrance
into the bricks-and-mortar retail market with physical bookstores (Amazon Books) and grocery
stores (following the acquisition of Whole Foods and opening of Amazon Go, its cashierless
grocery store)).
129. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 145 (noting that under the BSA, “third-party vendors can
communicate with the customer only through Amazon”).
130. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 500 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Musser
v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282 (Pa. 1989)).
131. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964 (W.D. Wis.
2019). As of September 2020, Amazon still faces multiple lawsuits seeking to hold it responsible
for damage or injuries caused by defective third-party products sold on its website. Pennsylvania’s

208

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1:187

Amazon’s integral role in the chain of distribution and the necessity of
holding Amazon strictly liable as the entity most responsible for the
overall placement of products into the consumer marketplace.
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc. serves as a flagship case signaling
this shift in the U.S. strict products liability regime.132 As previously
discussed, Oberdorf involved a plaintiff rendered permanently blind in
one eye after an accident involving a defective dog leash purchased from
a third-party vendor through Amazon.133 The Third Circuit examined
four factors from Pennsylvania precedent in determining whether
Amazon should constitute a seller: (1) whether the actor is the only
entity available for redress; (2) whether the imposition of strict liability
would serve as an incentive to safety; (3) whether the actor is in a better
position to prevent the circulation of defective products; and (4) whether
the actor could distribute the costs associated with incurring liability to
others.134 The court found all four factors weighed in favor of imposing
strict liability on Amazon under Pennsylvania law. 135 The majority
emphasized the exclusive role that Amazon serves in communicating
and interacting with customers, its ability to regulate the products that
appear and transactions that occur on its platform, and the existing
provisions for indemnification and fees that Amazon imposes in its
relationships with third-party vendors.136 Especially where third-party
vendors participate in the FBA program, the court determined
Amazon’s role extends beyond that of a “sales agent” or a mere
participant in the marketplace.137 FBA is the predominant method by
which third-party vendors, including the vendors in Allstate138 and
Eberhart,139 place their products into the market. Oberdorf, however,
stands as a rare exception: the third-party vendor in this case opted for
the FBM method of fulfillment.140 As a result, Amazon never took
and Ohio’s top courts were recently considering the issue, and federal appeals courts are weighing
cases under California and Texas law. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 136; Stiner v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
No. 2020-Ohio-4632, 2020 WL 5822477 (Oct. 1, 2020); McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 20-20108
(5th Cir. filed Mar. 2, 2020). As these cases proceed, there continue to be promising developments
in strict products liability for online retailers. See, e.g., Bolger v. Amazon.com, LLC, 267 Cal Rptr.
3d 601, 627–28 (Cal Ct. App. 2020) (holding Amazon strictly liable for injuries caused by an
exploding laptop battery sold by a third-party vendor, because Amazon had played a “pivotal” role
in the distribution chain bringing the product to the consumer).
132. 930 F.3d at 136.
133. Id. at 140.
134. Id. at 144 (citing Musser, 562 A.2d at 282).
135. Id. at 147–48.
136. Id. at 145–47.
137. Id. at 149.
138. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at *3 (D.N.J.
July 24, 2018).
139. Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
140. 930 F.3d at 142, 154.

2021]

THE NEW “WEB-STREAM” OF COMMERCE

209

physical possession of the dog collar, which the Furry Gang had shipped
directly to Oberdorf.141 And yet, the court still considered Amazon the
seller because it “exert[ed] substantial market control over product
sales by restricting product pricing, customer service, and
communications with customers.”142
In State Farm v. Amazon.com, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin similarly held Amazon
strictly liable for damage caused when a defective bathtub faucet,
purchased from a third-party vendor on Amazon, failed and caused
flooding in the purchaser’s home.143 The court focused on the role
Amazon played in providing the defective product to the market,
endorsing the principle that “strict liability derives from the act of
putting the defective product into the stream of commerce.”144 As in
most cases, the third-party vendor participated in the FBA program,
substantially increasing Amazon’s role in placing the defective faucet
into the plaintiff’s home. 145 The court held Amazon liable as the seller
and distributor of the defective bathtub faucet, serving as the proxy for
the unreachable manufacturer, because Amazon was an “integral part
of the chain of distribution, an entity well-positioned to allocate the
risks of defective products to the participants in the chain.”146
1. The Unreachable Problem
The four-part test applied in Oberdorf and reasoning
emphasized in State Farm together echo the rationales originally put
forth by Justice Traynor in Escola justifiying the imposition of strict
tort liability on both sellers and manufacturers of defective products.
The most practical reason for imposing strict liability on sellers is
present in many cases involving Amazon: the problem of the unknown
or unreachable third-party vendor or manufacturer, who is unable to be
contacted or not subject to process in the United States. In both Allstate
and State Farm, for example, the third-party vendors who supplied the
defective products to Amazon were not subject to process within each
respective state.147 And in Fox, the plaintiffs obtained a default
141. Id.
142. Id. at 149.
143. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 3d 964, 973–74 (W.D.
Wis. 2019).
144. Id. at 972.
145. Id. at 967.
146. Id. at 972.
147. Id. at 969; Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at
*4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (finding that “the record does not reflect that [the vendor], a Hong Kong
based company, was subject to process in this country.”).
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judgment against the third-party seller because it failed to appear and
because the manufacturer of the defective product could not be
identified.148 Finally, in Oberdorf, neither party was able to locate or
contact the third-party vendor that listed the defective dog collar
online.149 In those cases where a third-party vendor is so far removed
from the consumer as to be unreachable, or where a manufacturer is
unknown or not subject to process, strict liability should attach instead
to an online marketplace like Amazon as the member of the broader
production and distribution chain most reasonably available to
the consumer.150
The court in Oberdorf also noted that Amazon generally takes
no precautions to ensure that third-party vendors are in good legal
standing in the country where their business is registered, nor does it
have any vetting process to ensure that vendors are amenable to legal
process.151 And in cases such as Fox and Allstate, the plaintiffs asserted
that they reasonably believed they were purchasing the products
directly from Amazon.152 Regardless of how accurate this belief was, it
was more than reasonable in light of the pervasive role Amazon plays
in placing the product into the hands of consumers. If third-party
vendors are to remain unreachable and unaccountable for the injuries
caused by their defective products, then Amazon appropriately stands
as the “only member of the marketing chain available to the injured
plaintiff for redress.”153
2. Incentivizing Safety
Public policy additionally supports imposing strict liability on an
entity such as Amazon as the party that “will most effectively reduce
the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market.”154 Incentivizing a safer consumer marketplace is a strong
rationale for strict products liability.155 In the modern e-commerce
industry, Amazon is better situated, perhaps more than any other
148. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *1, *6 (M.D. Tenn.
May 30, 2018) (“[T]he manufacturer of the hoverboard at issue is unknown.”).
149. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2019).
150. Bullard, supra note 65, at 225–26; see also Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability
of Retailers, Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 246 (1987)
(“[I]f a manufacturer cannot be effectively sued and a judgment enforced, the reseller should be
held to the liability status of the manufacturer. Such secondary liability is necessary to minimize
a plaintiff being left without a liable and solvent defendant.”).
151. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 145.
152. Fox, 930 F.3d at 418; Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *11.
153. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 145.
154. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
155. See Bullard, supra note 65, at 215–16.
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entity, to efficiently and effectively construct a safer internet
marketplace for consumers.156 More than a mere “conduit” for products
between manufacturer and consumer, Amazon exerts substantial
control over third-party vendors and their goods through agreements
such as the BSA.157 For example, the BSA grants Amazon the right to
remove product listings, withhold payments to vendors, impose
transaction limits, and terminate service to a vendor for any reason.158
And in cases such as Erie where third-party vendors use the FBA
service, Amazon’s role in placing a defective product into the market is
substantially increased. Amazon may take charge of the warehousing,
packaging, shipping, handling, and even customer service for a
product159 and thus possesses the capability to remove unsafe products
from its marketplace.160 The need and potential for continuing sales
encourages an ongoing relationship between third-party vendors and
Amazon, providing a basis for indirect influence over the condition and
safety of products offered on its website. 161 Amazon thus enjoys a great
deal of leverage and could exert more pressure on third-party vendors
in order to verify and encourage the quality and safety of the products
sold on its website.162 Amazon wields sufficient market power to
regulate every aspect of the distribution and sales of products listed on
its website and could be effectively motivated by the threat of strict
liability to better supervise its relationships with third-party vendors.
Unfortunately, immunizing Amazon from tort liability for
defective products leads to the proliferation of the sale of dangerous
products.163 The adoption of strict liability for nonmanufacturing sellers
was designed to create “incentives for them to deal only with reputable,
financially responsible manufacturers and distributors, thereby
helping to protect the interests of users and consumers.”164 The entity
best able to provide that protection is Amazon.
156. Id. at 216.
157. See Cavico, supra note 150, at 227; see supra Section I.B.2.
158. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146.
159. Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 2019).
160. See Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 146 (“Amazon is fully capable, in its sole discretion, of removing
unsafe products from its website.”).
161. See id. (describing the indirect influence Amazon has over third-party vendors via the
terms of Amazon’s agreement).
162. Bullard, supra note 65, at 216.
163. See Alexandra Berzon, Shane Shifflett & Justin Scheck, Amazon Has Ceded Control of
Its Site. The Result: Thousands of Banned, Unsafe or Mislabeled Products, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23,
2019, 9:56 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-has-ceded-control-of-its-site-the-resultthousands-of-banned-unsafe-or-mislabeled-products-11566564990 [https://perma.cc/V6JK-97FW]
(documenting the pervasive and growing problem of Amazon products that have been declared
“unsafe by federal agencies, are deceptively labeled or are banned by federal regulators”).
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1998).
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3. Distribution of Costs
Considering its ever-growing influence and income, Amazon also
stands in the best position to distribute the costs of compensating for
potential liability. While it is true that Amazon does not directly or
initially set the price of products sold on its marketplace, 165 according
to the terms of the BSA, it does exert significant control over prices by
collecting a variety of fees from third-party vendors, which affects the
overall product price put forth by vendors.166 Therefore, Amazon
is capable of adjusting these fees in order to compensate for
potential liability.
Amazon could also increase such fees in order to pay for
increased costs of liability insurance against this expanded liability. In
general, products liability insurance functions as an effective
mechanism for shifting risk from the seller to the insurer, distributing
the cost among other policyholders, and providing further protections
for vulnerable customers.167 Amazon could advance the policy goal of
loss spreading by passing on some of the insurance costs to be borne by
third-party vendors.168
4. Social Responsibility
Finally, the imposition of strict products liability is justified
because Amazon should bear the social responsibility of making
defective products available to consumers. As the leading online
marketplace in the United States, Amazon plays an “integral role in
placing potentially dangerous products into consumers’ hands.” 169 The
purpose of strict products liability is to ensure that the costs of injuries
165. See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Under the
terms of the BSA, third-party sellers are responsible for deciding what to sell, sourcing their
products, providing product descriptions, setting the prices for their products, and packaging their
products . . . .” (emphasis added)); Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018
WL 3546197, at *8 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (similarly describing how Amazon’s agreements with
third-parties limit the control that it has over the third-parties’ products).
166. See Selling on Amazon Fee Schedule, AMAZON: SELLER CENT., https://sellercentral.
amazon.com/gp/help/external/200336920 (last visited Jan. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/MN4VR6NQ] (stating the variety of fees incurred by sellers on Amazon).
167. See Cavico, supra note 150, at 229 (“The imposition of strict tort liability upon nonmanufacturers is based on the significant rationale that retailers and wholesalers are entitled to
indemnity from the manufacturer.”).
168. See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964) (en banc) (“Strict
liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff
and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between
them in the course of their continuing business relationship.”).
169. Bullard, supra note 65, at 218; see Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171 (noting that retailers,
like manufacturers, “are an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise that
should bear the cost of injuries resulting from defective products”).

2021]

THE NEW “WEB-STREAM” OF COMMERCE

213

caused by defective products are borne by “the [entities] that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves.” 170 Not only has Amazon made these
products available to the marketplace but it arguably created that very
market—“a market that plausibly would not have existed but for its
distinctive efforts.”171
To establish Amazon’s liability, it should be sufficient for a
plaintiff to prove they were injured while using a defective product they
received through Amazon’s marketplace. If Amazon can shirk its
“special responsibility” for the sale of unsafe and defective products—
transactions for which it collects significant fees, capital, and
reputation—the existing strict products liability regime would be strict
no longer.172 It would be hypocritical for Amazon to exercise absolute
control over so many, if not all, aspects of a transaction and its
relationship with both vendors and buyers but claim no responsibility
whatsoever for the consequences of that transaction.173 As
commentators have noted, “[c]onsumers no longer approach products
warily but accept them on [faith], relying on the reputation of the
manufacturer or the [trademark].”174 The fact that Amazon
undoubtedly benefits economically and reputationally from its
dominant role in the marketplace further compels the imposition of tort
liability.175 This role, whether as manufacturer, retailer, wholesaler, or
distributor, whether for “personal profit or other benefit,” calls for the
imposition of strict liability.176

170. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).
171. Edelman & Stemler, supra note 60, at 190.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965).
173. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (en banc) (Traynor,
J., concurring):
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that
are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market
it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause
upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the
product, is responsible for its reaching the market.
174. Id. at 443.
175. See Bullard, supra note 65, at 219 (examining Amazon’s role in distributing defective
products and the benefits Amazon gains from this role).
176. Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); see Cavico,
supra note 150, at 221 (“[A]lthough not responsible for the manufacture and production of the
product, retailers, wholesalers, and distributors occupy a position in, and derive benefits from, the
marketing chain, which is sufficient to impose strict tort liability.”).
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III. SOLUTION: A RETURN TO TRUE STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The policy shift in products liability law that originated with
MacPherson and Escola was a response to the changing economies and
production systems of the twentieth century.177 However, in cases such
as Erie and Fox, courts have failed to recognize the increasingly
dominant role of e-commerce and internet retailers in the modern
economy and, as a result, have discounted Amazon’s significant role in
placing defective products into the marketplace.178 Public policy
considerations such as those discussed above, and recognition of the
unique role that Amazon plays in the modern internet economy, justify
a change in the law following the recent examples of Oberdorf and State
Farm.179 Passing such legislation would make it explicitly clear to both
buyers and sellers that injured consumers can sue online marketplaces
for defective or dangerous products, just as they traditionally would be
able to sue manufacturers or brick-and-mortar retailers.180 Without
such legislation, the risk remains that Amazon, with its increasingly
deep pockets, would continually push injured consumers to go to court
and encounter unsettled case law.
Generally, in the United States, there is no federal products
liability common law; rather, the contours of products liability
standards are determined by each state.181 States have enacted
comprehensive products liability statutes, some of which are modeled
177. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring) (“As handicrafts have been replaced
by mass production with its great markets and transportation facilities, the close relationship
between the producer and consumer of a product has been altered.”).
178. See supra Section II.A.
179. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d 135, 144–45 (4th Cir. 2019) (Motz, J.,
concurring) (“Amazon disrupts the traditional supply chain. . . . [C]onsiderations of public policy
may justify a change in the common law when, ‘in light of changed conditions or increased
knowledge, the former rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life.’ ”). See also
Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring) (“[The seller’s] obligation to the consumer must
keep pace with the changing relationship between them; it cannot be escaped because the
marketing of a product has become so complicated as to require one or more intermediaries.”).
180. Brick-and-mortar retailers have long been subject to product liability laws, but online
marketplaces like Amazon have been able to avoid the same level of liability for defective products
sold through their websites. As a promising example, California recently considered a bill that
would specifically hold “electronic retail marketplaces” to the same liability standards as applied
to brick-and-mortar retailers. The bill broadly defined “electronic retail marketplace” as an online
entity “engaged in the business of placing or facilitating the placement of products into the stream
of commerce[.]” Assemb. B. 3262, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). Though the California
Senate did not ultimately vote on the bill after it was passed by the State Assembly, the legislation
is expected to be reintroduced in 2021.
181. See Randolph J. Stayin, Status and Prospects of Federal Product Liability Legislation in
the United States, 15 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 99, 99 (1989) (“The varying product liability legal standards
in the fifty different states and the District of Columbia create a product liability system in which
manufacturers are confused and unable to predict the scope of their product responsibility
and liability.”).
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after the Model Uniform Products Liability Act or which contain
adopted provisions of the Restatement.182 Although commentators have
argued that the uniform applicability of a federal products liability law
could result in substantially lower legal costs and risks to product
manufacturers and sellers as they navigate the varying legal standards
in different states,183 the feasibility and details of such a supreme act
by Congress are beyond the scope of this Note. Federal reform of the
products liability regime merits deeper discussion, but this Note’s
solution does not advocate for the adoption of federal products liability
legislation. Put simply, tort law has traditionally been the province of
the states. Therefore, this Note recommends a statutory solution for
states to adopt, with the goal of products liability reform specifically for
online retail marketplaces.
A. Proposed Statutory Language
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a useful model for
the sort of absolute, strict liability advocated by Justice Traynor in
Escola that would appropriately subject an online marketplace like
Amazon to liability for injuries caused by defective products purchased
on its website.184 States should adopt statutory language echoing the
Restatement that would return to truly “strict” products liability,
extending liability to any party that is responsible for placing a
defective product into the stream of commerce, in order to provide a
method of recourse for consumers injured by defective products that
would not be reliant on the courts. As Justice Traynor concurred, an
entity should incur liability for defective products it “placed on the
market” that cause injury to consumers.185 Rather than proving
negligence, privity of contract, assumption of title, or attempting to
label an entity’s role in the distribution chain, such statutory language
should mimic the strict liability theory of section 402A of the
Restatement. State legislatures should afford neither manufacturers
nor retailers—whether traditional or online—protection from liability

182. The U.S. Department of Commerce published the Model Uniform Products Liability Act
(“MUPLA”) in 1979 in an attempt to encourage uniform procedures for responding to products
liability torts. It is worth noting that section 102 of the MUPLA defines “seller” similarly to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to include any person “engaged in the business
of selling” as well as manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, or retailers. MODEL UNIF. PROD.
LIAB. ACT § 102 (U.S. DEP’T OF COM. 1979).
183. Stayin, supra note 181, at 101.
184. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440.
185. Id.
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when a product is unreasonably dangerous and causes harm to the
ultimate user or consumer.186
Many states already have products liability statutes that
successfully echo the language of the Restatement,187 but courts have
misguidedly focused on other, alternative definitions of “seller” that
require assumption of title or degree of control over a product—
requirements that are absent from the Restatement and applicable case
law.188 Plainly, the Restatement defines a seller as any person “engaged
in the business of selling.”189 Tennessee’s products liability statute, at
issue in Fox, almost identically and broadly defines a “seller” as “any
individual or entity engaged in the business of selling a product.”190 And
New Jersey’s products liability statute, at issue in Allstate, contains an
effective example of a comprehensive, formal definition for
“product seller”:
[A]ny person who, in the course of a business conducted for that purpose: sells; distributes;
leases; installs; prepares or assembles a manufacturer’s product according to the
manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, specifications or formulations; blends; packages;
labels; markets; repairs; maintains or otherwise is involved in placing a product in the
line of commerce. 191

Georgia’s products liability statute provides a similar, expansive
definition of seller:
[A] person who, in the course of a business conducted for the purpose leases or sells and
distributes; installs; prepares; blends; packages; labels; markets; or assembles pursuant
to a manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, specifications, or formulation; or repairs;
maintains; or otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of commerce. 192

With these models in mind, state products liability statutes
should adopt a formal definition of “seller” that would include all
nonmanufacturing commercial retailers, wholesalers, and distributors
and that would assign liability to any individual or entity “engaged in
the business of selling products for use or consumption.” 193 This
definition should not reference, nor imply the necessity of, obtaining or
possessing title to a product in order to qualify as a seller (for example,

186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
187. Titus, supra note 56 (noting that “state courts in at least 15 jurisdictions” had adopted
section 402A just five years after its promulgation).
188. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
190. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (2012); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 415, 422 (6th
Cir. 2019).
191. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (West 2018).
192. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11.1(a) (2020).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965).
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as required by the Maryland law at issue in Erie).194 Rather than
including a title requirement or emphasizing the degree of control that
a particular entity exercises over a product,195 states should adopt an
expansive definition of “seller” to impose strict liability on any party
that “places or facilitates the placement of a defective product into the
stream of commerce.” Under this definition, an online marketplace like
Amazon would accordingly not be considered a mere intermediary; it
would be considered the true seller of products purchased on its website
because it has placed (or facilitated the placement of) those products
into the internet “web-stream” of commerce.
For states that adopt comparable definitions, this theory of strict
liability would still require that the business entity exist in the
defective product’s chain of distribution. The definition should also
focus the relevant inquiry on whether the seller’s conduct justifies
concluding that the seller has undertaken the “special responsibility for
the safety of the public” that those who are “engaged in the business of
selling” accept.196 Rather than listing out possible qualifications or
elements of liability—such as the business entity’s possession or
transfer of title, or the degree of control exercised over the transaction
or product—the phrase “one who sells”197 should be broadly interpreted
to mean “one who places into the stream of commerce.”198 In fact, the
only practical limitation on “one who sells” in the language of
section 402A excludes the “occasional seller of food or other such
products who is not engaged in that activity as a part of his business.”199
Such a limitation clearly would not exclude nonmanufacturing parties
such as distributors or online retailers who are dominant entities in the
chain of distribution.200
B. Effect on Other Online Retailers
Amazon has become an uncontested giant as an online
marketplace, and the imposition of strict products liability on such a
194. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-106 (1975); Erie Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 925 F.3d
135, 141 (4th Cir. 2019).
195. See Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (noting
that “neither the transfer of title to the goods nor a sale is required” for imposing strict liability on
both manufacturers and retailers).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965).
197. Id. § 402A(1).
198. Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: A
Mirror Crack’d, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 205, 213 (1990).
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965).
200. Jason R. Burt, The Effects of Judicial Immunization of Passive Sellers in Sanns v.
Butterfield Ford and a Proposal for the Shifting Nature of Fault, 2005 BYU L. REV. 477, 484–85
(2005).
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player would obviously have great effect on other online retailers in the
modern web economy. Amazon is more responsible, however, for the
marketing, distribution, and placement of products into the stream of
commerce than a mere “auctioneer” or neutral platform like eBay, Etsy,
or Craigslist.201 Such online platforms need not be threatened by any
expansion of liability under the proposed return to a true, strict
products liability regime.202
Under the proposed statutory solution, Amazon would assume
liability as seller because of its conduct in placing defective products
into the stream of commerce. Amazon exercises “substantial market
control over product sales by restricting product pricing, customer
service, and communications with customers” and is best positioned to
allocate the risks of defective products causing harm to consumers.203
Neutral platforms, in contrast, would not qualify as sellers under the
proposed statutory language—and therefore would not assume liability
for products displayed on their websites—because they would not be
considered as “engaged in the business of selling.”204 Rather, they are
in the business of hosting. Much like an auction company that provides
a market for sellers,205 neutral online platforms provide the technology
to connect modern buyers and sellers. They simply serve up the
electronic content—the ones and zeroes—that enables the transaction;
it is the seller who actually lists, maintains, physically possesses, and
ultimately places the product into the stream of commerce. So where
online retailers merely provide a website for consumers to visit in the
course of processing transactions with vendors, they would not be
considered engaged in the business of selling. Where the identity of
201. See supra Section II.A.3.
202. Online retailers such as Etsy and eBay have voiced criticism of Amazon for expressing
conditional support of California’s A.B. 3262, which sought to hold “electronic retail marketplaces”
to the same liability standards applied to brick-and-mortar retailers. See supra note 180. In a
surprise announcement, Amazon expressed it would support the bill if it were to include “all online
marketplaces regardless of their particular business models.” Brian Huseman, Amazon Stands
Ready to Support AB 3262 if All Stores Are Held to the Same Standards, ABOUTAMAZON (Aug. 21,
2020), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/policy-news-views/amazon-stands-ready-to-supportab-3262-if-all-stores-are-held-to-the-same-standards [https://perma.cc/W8XW-CW74]. Opponents
of the bill have argued that such consumer protection legislation would burden small businesses
with higher legal costs and stifle competition. Etsy’s CEO, for example, has claimed that Amazon
is using the guise of consumer safety to crush competitors, “by promoting complex, hard-to-complywith legislation that only they can afford to absorb.” Josh Silverman, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing:
California’s AB 3262 “Consumer Protection” Bill Will Empower Amazon to Put Small Businesses
Out of Business, MEDIUM (Aug. 25, 2020), https://medium.com/etsy-impact/a-wolf-in-sheepsclothing-california-s-ab-3262-consumer-protection-bill-will-empower-amazon-to-c131ffedc3dd
[https://perma.cc/A5SC-V6PG].
203. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 149 (3d Cir. 2019).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965).
205. Oberdorf, 930 F.3d at 144 (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279, 282
(Pa. 1989)).
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sellers is apparent and distinguishable; where sellers provide, edit, and
publish their own product information content and set their own prices;
where sellers pursue independent relationships with consumers and
exclusively ship products directly to buyers; and where consumers
communicate and inquire freely with sellers without limitations—then
an online retailer would appropriately be considered a neutral platform,
merely providing the “means of marketing” for sellers but not a
seller itself.
Further developments and expansions in the world of ecommerce might justify a larger evolution in strict products liability
theory, one that could someday subject all online platforms to some
form of liability for defective products that pass through their web
pages. This Note’s solution, however, does not propose such an extreme
advancement. Instead, it advocates a return to the theory of “absolute”
strict products liability espoused by Justice Traynor and articulated in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts that extends liability to any party
responsible for placing a defective product into the stream of commerce.
This original formulation of strict products liability is the one that best
respects an e-commerce seller’s obligations to its consumers in the
context of the modern internet economy.
CONCLUSION
Brick-and-mortar stores struggle to compete with e-commerce
entities as consumers are no longer purchasing products directly from
manufacturers or in person from stores. In the modern internet
economy, products move through complex online retail chains of
distribution, with manufacturers, packagers, shippers, warehousers,
distributors, vendors, and purchasers each interacting with products at
different points in this new World Wide Web-stream of commerce.
Existing law must accommodate (or rather, reaccommodate) these
economic and technological realities. States should embrace a products
liability regime that would appropriately hold an online marketplace
like Amazon liable as seller for injuries caused by the defective products
it places into the stream of commerce. Amazon should not be free to
profit from the bursting digital economy while absorbing none of the
risks imposed on buyers associated with the internet sale and purchase
of defective products. The theory of strict products liability offered in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the public policy rationales
espoused by Justice Traynor in Escola provide a useful model for
properly assigning liability for defective products to Amazon and
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similarly situated online retail marketplaces.206 Courts and state
legislatures alike should continue to recognize Amazon’s integral
market role and its powerful position relative to consumers, and hold
Amazon to a comparable legal standard of responsibility. 207
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